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Zusammenfassung
Theoretische Konzepte aus der empirischen Mystikforschung: Eine Jamessche Perspek-
tive
Die Forschung im Bereich des Mystizismus wird erschwert durch zahlreiche
Ansätze, die sich gegenseitig auf weiten Strecken ignorieren. Dieser Umstand
wird noch bestärkt dadurch, dass diese unterschiedlichen Ansätze alle die Existenz
introvertierter Mystik akzeptieren und ähnlich charakterisieren. Dabei greifen
sie auf eine große Bandbreite empirischer Ansätze zurück. Im Folgenden wird
nun unter Rückgriff auf William James' Anstrengungen, Psychologie innerhalb
der Grenzen der Wissenschaft zu verorten, argumentiert, dass James unter Einfluss
seines sich ständig erweiternden Konzept von Empirizismus, ein reduktionistisches
Konzept der Mystik ablehnte. Dies ist ebenfalls Konsens in der aktuellen Mystik-
forschung. Außerdem wird gezeigt, dass zur Erforschung eines introvertierten
Mystizismus Sprache und Kultur nicht als alleinige Konzepte zur Erklärung
herangezogen werden können, sondern vielmehr ein empirischer Ansatz benötigt
wird.
Schüsselwörter: Mystizismus/Mystik, William James, introvertiert, Phenomenologie
Summary
The study of mysticism is hampered by the existence of discreet literatures that
remain largely ignorant of one another. This is further exacerbated by the fact
that these literatures converge toward a consensus on the existence and characte-
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ristic of introvertive mysticism using a variety of empirical methods. Tracing the
efforts of William James to confine psychology within the limits of natural science
assumptions it is argued that James' ever expanding definition of empiricism led
him to abandon what amounts to a reductionistic view of mysticism, something
the discreet literatures on mysticism have also reached as a consensus position.
Furthermore, with respect to at least introvertive mysticism, language and culture
cannot be considered as exhaustive explanations of its fundamental empirical
reality.
Keywords: mysticism, William James, introvertive, phenomenology
Zusammenfassung
Theoretische Konzepte aus der empirischen Mystikforschung: Eine Jamessche
PerspektiveDie Forschung im Bereich des Mystizismus wird erschwert durch
zahlreiche Ansätze, die sich gegenseitig auf weiten Strecken ignorieren. Dieser
Umstand wird noch bestärkt dadurch, dass diese unterschiedlichen Ansätze alle
die Existenz introvertierter Mystik akzeptieren und ähnlich charakterisieren.
Dabei greifen sie auf eine große Bandbreite empirischer Ansätze zurück. Im Fol-
genden wird nun unter Rückgriff auf William James' Anstrengungen, Psychologie
innerhalb der Grenzen der Wissenschaft zu verorten, argumentiert, dass James
unter Einfluss seines sich ständig erweiternden Konzept von Empirizismus, ein
reduktionistisches Konzept der Mystik ablehnte. Dies ist ebenfalls Konsens in
der aktuellen Mystikforschung. Außerdem wird gezeigt, dass zur Erforschung
eines introvertierten Mystizismus Sprache und Kultur nicht als alleinige Konzepte
zur Erklärung herangezogen werden können, sondern vielmehr ein empirischer
Ansatz benötigt wird.
Schlagwörter: Mystizismus/Mystik, William James, introvertiert, Phenome-
nologie
The contemporary study of mysticism is stymied by the existence of separate
and discrete literatures that continue to remain largely ignorant of each other.
McGinn (1994) has noted that this results in an »unrealized conversation« (p.
343). McGinn’s threefold classification of these distinct literatures combines
comparativist/psychological as one literature distinct from theological and philo-
sophical literatures (McGinn, 1994, pp. 265-343)]. He ignores other distinct li-
2 Ralph W. Hood Jr.
teratures on mysticism, including measurement based studies of mysticism and
experimental and quasi-experimental elicitation of mystical experiences in both
laboratory and natural life conditions (Hood, 1995a; 1997). Thus, McGinn’s
unrealized conversation involves more literatures than the three he reviews. One
noted scholar of mysticism argues that we do not need more studies of mysticism
but rather conceptual clarification concerning the data on mysticism we already
have (Almond, 1982), scattered it is among diverse literatures.
In this light, I want to note that significant figures in the contemporary
psychology of religion have called for changes in the psychology of religion. Per-
haps most critical is Wulff’s identification of psychology of religion as a field in
crisis and the suggestion that perhaps we should start over (Wulff, 2003). Emmons
and Paloutzian (2003) have called for a new multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm
for the psychology of religion, one that is applauded by many of the authors in
the recent Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality (Paloutzian &
Parks, 2005). The call for a new paradigm is presented in a hopeful and positive
fashion in opposition to Wulff’s more pessimistic assessment of the field. However,
even the call for a new paradigm can be read as including a subtext that the psy-
chology of religion has the same unrealized conversation that has characterized
the discrete literatures on mysticism. Hood & Williamson (2008) have presented
what they suggest could be an exemplar of the multilevel interdisciplinary para-
digm based upon many years of research on Christian serpent handlers. Belzen
has offered another exemplar in his study of the conversion among the »bevinde-
lijken« (Belzen 1999; Belzen & Hood, 2006, pp. 23-24). The Hood and William-
son exemplar includes qualitative and quantitative methods while Belzen’s exem-
plar is purely qualitative. However, the issue is not simply whether one employs
qualitative or quantitative methods but simply that psychologists committed to
the multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm will have to be pluralistic and not sim-
ply champion advanced statistical methods that in fact advance the older measu-
rement paradigm in the psychology of religion identified with Gorsuch, (1984).
Recently, Kohls, Hack, & Walach (2008) have demonstrated the benefits of
mixing qualitative and quantitative methods in the assessment of spiritual expe-
riences, including mystical experiences.
These introductory remarks are to place my recommendation that a recon-
sideration of the work of William James might be a place to gain insights into
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what characterizes the unrealized conversations in psychology of religion and in
the study of mysticism. Much of what I have to say is based upon my presidential
address to Division 36 of the APA which was also an invited paper in the initial
issue of a new journal in the psychology of religion that unfortunately stalled al-
most as soon as it was launched (Hood, 1992). I use the frame of my earlier ad-
dress and to flesh out a major concern I have with the study of mysticism. So
while I will begin with James, I will end with a focus upon the empirical study
of mysticism and what I see as a rich harvest that can be gathered from the fruits
we already have that are ripe. The bringing together of these literatures is in what
I take to be the spirit of the interdisciplinary in the call for a new paradigm in the
psychology of religion and the beginning of a realized conversation among
scholars employing diverse methodologies who have created discrete literatures,
largely ignorant of one another but nevertheless converging to a significant degree
on several crucial issues in the study of mysticism.
Elsewhere I have argued that despite the deserved reputation of James' Va-
rieties of Religious Experience (1902/1981, hereafter VRE) it is wise to read it as
partly a response to issues that he alluded to in his monumentally influential
Principles of Psychology (1890/l981, hereafter PP) but refused to address (Hood,
1995b; 2002). James effort in the PP was to restrict himself to the assumptions
of natural science, an appeal that continues to influence many psychologist of
religion today. Yet as other commentators have noted, James failed in his attempt.
The PP quickly becomes philosophical, even metaphysical (Wild, 1969). In one
of the earliest reviews of the PP, Ladd noted the extensive engagement with me-
taphysical speculations in the PP. He titled his review, »Psychology as So-Called
'Natural Science« (Ladd ,1892). In it he insisted that a psychology without me-
taphysical considerations is too constrictive. He astutely took James to task for
attempting to admit only one metaphysical position as explanatory for psycholo-
gy – that of the correlation between thoughts and brain states. James and others
quickly responded to Ladd’s review. A debate was started that continues to
trouble psychology today (see Belzen & Hood, 2006 Giorgi, 1990; Wulff, 2003).
Deconstructionist readings of James suggest that James knew what he was
doing and who his audience was to be so that reading James requires placing Ja-
mes' writings in the context of the audiences to which many were initially deli-
vered as lectures (Seigfried, 1990). James' efforts to separate psychology from
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philosophy (metaphysics) in the PP can be seen as an effort to show the limits of
a natural science perspective, not to exclude psychological consideration of what
is outside those limits (Barnard, 1997; Hood, 1994, 1995b; Seigfried, 1990). In
this sense, after writing the PP James' oeuvre can be seen as an effort to start over
given the metaphysical limits that psychology must transcend if it is to appropria-
tely confront the totality of experienced reality. As we shall see residual issues left
unexplained by methodologies of the natural sciences could be reintroduced by
a psychology in the VRE that is more sensitive to metaphysical alternatives. The
almost exclusive reliance upon testimonies as the basic data for in the VRE led
Wundt to deny that it was a psychological work (Belzen, 2006, p. 53). Similar
criticism were leveled against the PP, however Royce, James' friend and adversary
in what Perry (1935, vol. 1, xxxi) has aptly phrased, »The battle of the absolute,«
applauded James' refusal to ignore philosophical issues in the PP: He does not
try, as many nowadays do, to hide the fact that every psychologist who is more
than an elementary student or a Philistine must really formulate philosophical
hypotheses, whether or not one is man enough to confess the fact and take re-
sponsibility for it (in Seigfried, 1990:402).
Royce’s recognition of the relevance of James' philosophical discussion in
the PP can be contrasted to the avoidance of philosophical commentary in the
contemporary psychology of religion (Belzen & Hood, 2006, pp. 11-12). In James'
abridgement of the PP, much of the reduction was accomplished by the exclusion
of philosophical material. Royce’s comments proved prophetic. James concludes
the greatly abridged PP, Psychology: The Briefer Course as follows: … at present
psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo and the laws of motion,
of chemistry before Lavoiser and the notion that mass is preserved in all reactions.
The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when
they come, as come they some day surely will, or past successes are no index to
the future. When they do come, however, the necessities of the case will make
them 'metaphysical.' Meanwhile the best way in which we can facilitate their
advent is to understand how great is the darkness in which we grope, and never
to forget that the natural science assumptions with which we started are provisional
and reversible things (James, 1892, 468, emphasis mine).
The »metaphysical leaks« (James, 1892:467) in a purely natural science ap-
proach to psychology are nowhere more obvious than in two threads that can be
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traced throughout the entire corpus of James' writings: issues of self and of my-
sticism (Barnard, 1997, Dainton, 2000; Fontinell, 1986; Levinson, 1981; Myers,
1982; Richardson, 2006). In discussing these issues we shall expand a bit our
reading of James to include material that helps illuminate the relationship between
the psychology of the PP and that of the VRE.
James had much to say about being radically empirical as opposed to simply
adopting natural science assumptions uncritically asserted to be empirical. To do
so is to follow what Coon (1992, p. 143) has identified tongue in cheek as a form
of psychological adolescent »physics envy«. James demands empiricism, but one
that is radical. It transcends the natural science limits and is compatible with the
assumption that the fundamental reality of nature may not at all be a concatena-
tion of impersonal forces (Barnard, 1991, p. 47).
In the PP many of the metaphysical issues raised that suggest different opti-
ons for interpreting psychological data were to be more fully developed by James
as the doctrine of radical empiricism (Myers, 1986; Richardson, 2006). James
would articulate radical empiricism first as a postulate, that the only things deba-
table are those drawn from experience; second as a statement of fact, both disjunc-
tive and conjunctive relations between things are as much matters of direct expe-
rience as the things themselves; and third as a generalized conclusion, that »the
directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical
connective support, but possess in its own right a concatenated or continuous
structure« (in McDermott, 1968, p. 136).
While James philosophy and his psychology in the VRE is often described
as functionalism (the postulational nature of radical empiricism is the basis for
extolling James' method in both the PP and VRE as, if not anticipating pheno-
menology, than at least being proto-phenomenological (Edie, 1987; Fontinell,
1986; Hood, 2002; Wild, 1970; Wilshire, 1968). What James' method is called
is less my concern here that that experience be the basis for psychology of religion
in general and mysticism in particular. In his second presidential address to the
APA James presented the principle of pure experience as a methodological postu-
late:
Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it says, except what can be experienced
at some definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever
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so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system
of reality. In other worlds: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere
and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real (James,
1912/1976, p. 81).
James' theory of radical empiricism is intended to be a form of scientific positi-
vism. However, as Perry has noted: But the positivism of James was almost the
precise opposite of the doctrine which now passes by that name. Contemporary
positivism closes all the doors but one, while James' positivism opened all the doors
and kept them opened (Perry, 1958, p. 79, emphasis mine).
Similarly Perry notes that James responded in a letter to the positivist psy-
chologist, Ribot, that the ordinary positivist »simply has a muddled metaphysic
which he refuses to criticize or discuss «(1958, p. 58). With this we have come
back to Belzen & Hood (2006, pp. 11-12) who argue that psychologists must
be sensitive to various philosophical assumption, (none of which are non- proble-
matic) that undergird various psychological methodologies. Likewise, Dainton
(2000, p. iv) has noted that the phenomenological study of consciousness refuses
to allow consciousness to be explained in terms of something else and thus requires
that long neglected metaphysical options must be taken seriously once again.
If we now return to James' treatment of mysticism in the VRE it is to focus
on two basic points. First, the VRE provides at least a partial refutation to the
treatment of the self in the PP from a purely natural science psychology. Second,
James' resolution of the discrepancy between the self of the PP and of the VRE
is decidedly mixed and can be clarified by the empirical fruits culled from a
multilevel interdisciplinary study of mysticism. We shall address each of these
claims in turn.
The Self in the PP and in the VRE
As I have developed more fully elsewhere, James' treatment of the self in the PP
was simply an empirical claim that neither the skepticism of Hume nor the appeal
of Kant to a purely formal principle (the synthetic unity of apperception) were
needed to account for the lack of sense of self in consciousness (Hood, 1995b,
2002). For our purposes here we need but note that James applauds Hume’s
phenomenological or introspective perspective in failing to find a personal sense
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of self within or behind consciousness. I quote from Hume’s original, appealed
to by James:
For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
tumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or
shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time wi-
thout a perception, and never can observe any 'thing' but the perception.
When my perception are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long
as I am insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist (Hume, 1886,
p. 534, emphasis in original).
James applauds Hume for his »good piece of introspective work« (James,
1880//1991, p. 333) but goes on to reject Hume’s inability to note conjunctive
as well as disjunctive relationships in terms of the principle of radical empiricism
noted above. James’s critique of the associationist theories in the PP applies here
to Hume’s incomplete introspection (finding disjunctive but not conjunctive
relationships). Given that disjunctive and conjunctive relationships are both re-
vealed in experience, the refusal to acknowledge conjunctive relationships is a
defect of Hume’s incomplete introspection led James to claim that »Hume is at
bottom as much a metaphysician as Thomas Aquinas« (James, 1890/1991, p.
334). James is equally condemning of Kant’s (1787/1956) solution to Hume’s
inadequate introspection. Kant postulated a purely logical principle, the transcen-
dental synthetic unity of apperception. James rejected this as but a «'cheap and
nasty' edition of the soul.« (James, 1890/1991, p. 345). He found it to be neither
logically nor empirically necessary. He quipped, »Although Kant’s name it is so
long, our consciousness of about it, is, according to him, short enough« (James,
1880/1991, p. 342). What was James solution to the sense of identity reflected
in consciousness? The purely empirical answer in the PP was that none was nee-
ded!
The Thought is a vehicle of choice as well as of cognition; and among
choices it makes are these appropriations, or repudiations of its »own.« But the
Thought never is an object in its own hands; it never appropriates or disowns
itself (James, 1890/1991, p. 323).
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James' purely empirical resolution in the PP is that we need not speak of a
consciousness, thinking its existence along with all else it thinks thus assuring a
sense of personal identity.
Instead, of the state of though being one of con-sciousness … It might
better be called a stream of Sciousness pure and simple, thinking objects of some
of which it makes what it calls a »Me« and unaware of its »pure« self in an abstract
of hypothetic, or conceptual ways (James, 1890/1981, pp. 290-291).
I will leave James' Sciousness here as all that is required from the viewpoint
of psychology as a natural science. The philosophical issues raised by though ap-
propriating past thoughts without the necessity of a personal I or consciousness
continues to intrigue contemporary philosophers concerned with the unity and
continuity in consciousness experience (Dainton, 2000; Zahvi, 2005). It also
continues to dominate discussion by those who defend a nonmaterial view of the
self (Foster, 1996). However, the real issue of Sciousness cannot be fully evaluated
outside the issues of the nature of mystical experience. Here, as we shall see, the
James of the Varieties favors a consciousness aware of itself as a self.
Mystical Experience in the VRE
Elsewhere I have argued for reading James' treatment of mysticism in the Varieties
as an example of the unity thesis in mysticism (Hood, 2003). The unity thesis is
the view that both within and outside of the great faith traditions, is an experience
that is essentially identical, regardless of interpretation. James put the issue thusly:
In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian Mysticism, in
Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note, so that there is about mystical
utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think,
and which brings it about that the mystical classics have, as has been said,
neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man
with God, their speech antedate language, and they do not grow old (James,
1902/1985, p. 332, emphasis mine)
The above quote clearly hints at two of the basic assumptions of those who support
the unity thesis. First, it implies that a distinction can be made between experience
and its interpretation. Second, it suggests that for at least some linguistic descrip-
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tions, an underlying uniform experience cuts across language differences (Hood,
2003, 2006). This position has been most systematically developed by Stace
(1961) under the rubric of the common core thesis and is the basis of the most
commonly used empirical measure of mysticism, the Mysticism Scale which has
been used in numerous studies for more than a quarter of a century (Hood, 1975,
1997).
Of particular relevance for my discussion of James' Sciousness is what Stace
refers to as introvertive mysticism, an experience of union in which there is sim-
ply an ineffable awareness of pure consciousness. The report of this experience
can be measured and is found in many cultures to be ineffably the same.
To identify an experience as ineffably the same raises a variety of conceptual
issues that have occupied the concerns of scholars of mysticism. As Barnard states:
There has been such a stress on the linguistic nature of experience in recent
philosophical thought that lay claims to immediacy or to a knowledge that is not
structured linguistically are instantly suspect (Barnard, 1997, p. 120).
Likewise, Rorty (1999 p. 24) has noted that the linguistic turn in philosophy
corresponded with contemporary philosophers not having their students read
James. However, critical phenomenologist have begun to re-assert the relevance
of James whose PP is characterized by Dainton (2000, p. xv) as »that great source
of phenomenological insights and descriptions. «
Rorty’s statement readily identifies the two major contending schools in the
contemporary empirical study of mysticism in the West. One championed by
Proudfoot (1985) and several scholars who have rallied around Katz in a series
of edited books (Katz, 1977, 1983, 1985) denies the distinction between experi-
ence and interpretation. Basically, the crucial claim is that there can be no unme-
diated experiences, an assumption that continues to affirm the dominance of
Kant’s philosophy in contemporary psychology (Robinson, 1976, p. 219-226)
and among the first generation of postmodern philosophers (Benedikter, 2007,
part 2, p. 7).
The other school of mysticism is championed by Parsons (1999) and those
who have rallied around Forman in a series edited books (Forman, 1990, 1998).
This camp does not accept neo- Kantian thought uncritically and is heavily influ-
enced by Eastern philosophy. It also refuses to accept reductionist explanations
of mysticism once common in classical psychoanalysis (Simonds, 2006). They
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refuse in Barnard’s phrasing, to privilege Kant over Dōgen (1991, p. 116) and
argue for the reality of ineffable experiences of union for which, as Stace (1961,
p. 203) has noted, there is no principium individuationis. In Brainard’s (2000, p.
269) phrasing such experiences are »nondiscursive intimations of direct experience«
and in a similar phrasing Benedikter (2007) refers to a »pre-conceptual life stream«
(part 2, p. 12) or a »pre-conceptual self-awareness of consciousness (part IV, p.
1). Such experiences are neither linguistically constructed nor, as we shall see
below, capable of being deconstructed. They offer evidence in favor of a direct,
unmediated experience of reality acceptable in many Eastern philosophical systems
(Coward, 1990) and in forms of Western apophatic mysticism (Benedikter, 2007;
Cupitt, 1998).
Given my own treatment of James' as an exemplar of the unity or common
core thesis (Hood, 2003, 2006) it might sound contradictory to reference Barnard
(1997, p. 135) who argues that James is not an advocate of the common core or
unity thesis. However, the contradiction between my view and Barnard’s is more
apparent that real if we but remember that James always spoke and wrote with
a particular audience in mind (Seigfried, 1990; Richardson, 2006).
Barnard has identified an issue that allows a different reading of the VRE
in light of contemporary studies of mysticism. It is to an overview of these studies
that we begin to identify the fruits of a Jamesian perspective on a variety of my-
sticisms viewed in a pluralist perspective. To do so we will distinguish between
trait and state mysticism as first suggested by (Forman, 1999).
It is widely accepted by biographers of James that he approached his Gifford
lectures with an eye toward refuting absolute idealims, especially as championed
by his friend and colleague at Harvard, Josiah Royce (Levinson, 1981 Myers
1986; Perry, 1958; Richardson, 2006 ). James own widely quoted definition of
mysticism in the VRE must be put in context, It was less a definition than an
effort to mark off a territory for discussion for the purposes of the present lectures
(James, 1902/1985, p. 302, emphasis mine). He knew that despite his own
emerging commitment to pluralism, the understanding of mysticism was often
in terms of philosophical monism.
The practical unanimous tradition of 'regular' mysticism has been unques-
tionable monistic; and inasmuch as it is the characteristic of mystics to speak,
not as scribes, but as men who have 'been there' and seen with their own eyes, I
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think this sovereign manner must have made some pluralistic-minded students
hesitate, as I confess it has often given pause to me (in Barnard, p. 30).
James' four markers of mystical experience include as second criteria passi-
vity and transiency. While I think passivity emphasizes James' bias toward Pro-
testant spontaneous experiences as opposed to practices long cultivated in Catho-
licism (to cite but one example) this marker does serve to insist that mystical ex-
periences are facilitated by various practices, but cannot be produced assuredly
by them (Hood, 1995a). We will return to this latter but for now cultural prac-
tices can be viewed as distal set and setting factors to facilitate or inhibit mystical
experiences that as I will argue below can nevertheless transcend a culture that
facilitates them (Also, Hood, in 2008).
James' second marker is also secondary. It simply notes that mystical expe-
rience is transient. Forman (1999) has recently identified transient mystical expe-
riences as state mysticism, a useful distinction when we return to James Sciousness
of the PP. Here we but note that if not all mystical experiences are transient, then
the possibility of state mysticism emerges that has consequences for James'
treatment of personal identity in the PP.
The two primary markers of mystical experience that James' employs for
his Gifford lectures are that these experiences are noetic and ineffable. His insis-
tence on noetic is crucial, especially when combined with the other primary
marker of mysticism, ineffability. Here is the strongest claim to situate James
with the common core or unity school of mysticism. Ironically, it is first expressed
in a curious quote given James' intent to battle with monism. »In mystic states
we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness«(Ja-
mes, 1890/1985, p. 332). James reference to the Absolute is partly sleight of
hand, for he readily admits in the written lectures that his preference is for God
since God is (a) a medium of communion and (b) a causal agent (James,
1902/1985, p. 402, footnote 32). Furthermore, that consciousness is not oblite-
rated is crucial for James, for he insists in the written lectures that, »Consciousness
of illumination is of us the essential mark of 'mystical states'« (James, 1902/1985,
p. 323-324, footnote 28). The continual referenced to mystical states would seem
to remove James from the common core or unity school which argues for a
commonality across interpretation and cultures for a singular mystical state.
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The trouble with any one reading of James is that if his work is taken as a
whole, a more complete representation of his divergent stands on many issues
can be identified (Barnard, 1997; Seigfried, 1990; Richardson, 2006). While in
parts of the VRE James does write as if his focus is on introvertive mysticism, he
also places mysticism in a context of numerous experiences (his »mystical ladder«)
that clearly are not instances of introvertive mysticism. Barnard (1991, p. 63)
has noted that ultimate James equates mystical experience with any submarginal
or subliminal state none of which are clearly pure consciousness experiences. In-
cluding in these submarginal experiences are James’s diabolical mysticism, a »sort
of religious mysticism turned upside down« (James, 1902/1985, p. 337). In this
sense, the measure of transliminality developed by Thalbourne, (1998) is the
most Jamesian measure of mysticism we have. It is a single factor scale measuring
essentially subliminal states of consciousness. Thalbourne & Delin (1994, p. 25)
coined the term transliminal to refer to a common underlying factor that is largely
an involuntary susceptibility to inwardly generated psychological phenomena of
an ideational and affective kind. However, transliminality is also related to a hy-
persensitivity to external stimulation (Thalbourne, 1998, p. 403) such that
transliminaltiy becomes a Jamesian measure of the sub marginal region where as
noted above where «'seraph and snake' abide there side by side (James, 1902/1985,
p. 338). While this sub marginal region includes mystical phenomena of a wide
variety, this transliminal domain is more than simply introvertive mysticism and
insofar as it is contentless excludes introvertive mysticism as noted above. Lange
& Thalbourne (1999) have also developed a single factor measure of mysticism
that is more restricted than simply what I have called the transliminal domain,
but is similar to James' treatment of mysticism in the VRE as it allows for interval
scaling of intensity of experiences, as an empirical mystical ladder of sorts.
Even in the VRE James quickly retreats from a focus upon only introvertive
mysticism. He admits to focusing primarily on classical mysticism. On the fringes
where a wide variety of mystical experiences exists the unanimity evaporates.
The fact is that mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation
has no specific intellectual content of its own. It is capable of forming matrimo-
nial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theo-
logies provided only that they can find a place in their framework for its particular
emotional mood« (James, 1902/1985, p. 337).
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These remarks need not disturb the common core or unity theorists as they
already accept the ineffability of the introvertive mystical state. Insofar as the li-
miting case of the experience of enlargement or union is a pure consciousness
event. The role of language and culture in interpreting the state is not challenged
but their role in determining the state (experience) is.
With respect to introvertive mysticism, James' sub marginal thesis argues
that the self becomes aware of what he James' simply identified as »MORE of
the same quality« (1902/1985, p. 401, emphasis in original).« He also notes that,
»It is when we treat of the experience of 'union' with it that their [mystics] diffe-
rences appear most clearly« (p. 401). Thus, James can accept an aspect of the
constructionist position which was articulated at the time of James' VRE by
Rufus Jones, »The most refined mysticism, the most exalted spiritual experience
is partly a product of the social and intellectual environment in which the personal
life of the mystic has formed and matured (1909, p. xxxiv, italics in original).
Jones' emphasis on is crucial, for it allows what James allows, that portions of
experience escape cultural influences. Stace (1961, pp. 153-154) notes that self
transcendence (James »MORE«) is part of the experience and not of the interpre-
tation of experience.
Recently Forman has coined the term pure consciousness experience (PCE)
for Stace’s introvertive mysticism. He is part of what I call confessional scholars
of mysticism, those who include their own mystical experiences as part of their
scholarly treatment of mysticism (Barnard, 1997, Forman, 1999, Roberts, 1984).
These scholars acknowledge the identity of introvertive states. Barnard goes too
far as to identify PCE »knowledge by identity« (1999, p. 109-127) which perhaps
is less an explanation than a re-affirmation of James' »MORE.« However, the
value of confessional mystics who study mysticism cannot be underestimated
both for the methodological value of their insights (Staal, 1975) and of the value
of returning psychology to the researcher as subject that characterized psycholo-
gical research at its inception as a laboratory science (Danzinger, 1994).
While knowledge by identity may not be an explanation, it does appear to
be an adequate description of a limiting case. We can identify this limiting case
empirically by calculating a ratio between James' well-known distinction between
knowledge about and knowledge by acquaintance or knowledge of explored
throughout the PP. For my purpose here it is sufficient to note that there is a
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subject/object distinction in knowledge about. Hence it is linguistically and cul-
turally constructed knowledge. Therefore, it can also be deconstructed. Knowledge
of is experience gained by participation, and can be prior to language. The ratio
between knowledge of and knowledge about approaches the limiting case of a
PCE or introvertive mysticism. That this state may only be approximated in
many is not to assume that linguistic and cultural factors alone explain it nor that
in the limiting case these factors play a significant explanatory role.
The closest approximation to the attainment of this limiting case is addressed
by Stace . His comment is based upon Pratt’s discussion (1920, pp. 128-131) of
the well-known case of Madeleine, a mystic kept under observation in Salpêtrière
by Janet. Pratt noted that she recognized objects placed in her hand when hypno-
tized. However, the issue for Stace is an empirical one: whether she was consciously
aware of this. Acknowledging that hypnosis can trigger mystical states, he goes
on to argue
Suppose that he [Pratt] is mistaken to the extent that there is on the other-
wise undifferentiated glassy surface of the One some faint smudge of impurity,
some wisp of gossamer imagery; or that at the centre of the Void, or perhaps at
its edges, there is a little sport of something or other which we will call the non-
void? … Whatever we may think of what is supposed to be the mystical vision,
it surely cannot be reasonably maintained that it is nothing but a very fait visual;
image, a tiny sound, a spot of dim and almost invisible light? (Stace, 1961, pp.
130-131).
One of the most critical treatments of PCE is by Almond (1982). Not limi-
ted to neo-Kantian assumptions that fuel the social constructionists, he reminds
us that »There is nothing logically inherent about the notion of a contentless ex-
perience (Almond, 1982, p. 174). Furthermore, he makes once more the case
that is an empirical possibility that such experiences can transcend linguistic
(hence cultural) constructions:
Now in the mystical case, and taking a theistic mystical experience as our
example, what remains as the basic datum of mystical experience if the content
of the experience, the experience of the self in union with God, is abstracted?
The residue is a contentless experience, one in which there is neither awareness
of the self (of normal consciousness) nor of 'anything' standing over against the
self – a state in which, unlike the waking and the dream-state, there is no subject-
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object polarity. It is, furthermore, a state in which there is neither incorporated
paradigmatic beliefs or symbols, nor, ergo reflexive interpretation, for there are
no beliefs, thoughts, symbols, or dual awareness therein. In other words, it is a
state in which the distinctions between the knower, the act of knowing, and what
is know are obliterated (Almond, 1982, p. 174).
Enough examples have been provided to support the claim that both con-
ceptually and empirically reports of pure consciousness events of trait introvertive
mystical experience occur across many contexts ands situations. Scholars of my-
sticism who have focused heavily upon mystical text and reports of mystical ex-
periences have not surprisingly documented the immense effects of language and
culture on the description of PCE’s. However, the confessional scholars of mysti-
cism have noted the ability to talk to other mystics and confirm that across tradi-
tions, identical experiences occur (Forman, 1999, pp. 21-27). Likewise, the
scholars who support the unity thesis have concluded that conceptually, »In so
far as we are speaking of contentless mystical experiences, there is a unanimity
and a universality which transcends the cultural content in which they occur «
(Almond, 1982, p. 176). In terms of my concern for a truly interdisciplinary
study of mysticism we have three empirical convergences from radically different
methodological stances that strongly suggest that there is at least one form of
mystical experience that transcends linguistic and cultural constructionism. I
want to briefly emphasize each of these convergent strains of empirical support
for the unity thesis.
First, there is a series of empirical measurement based studies employing
the Mysticism scale that has operationalized Stace’s common core theory that
itself was phenomenologically derived. In this sense it is an empirical approach
that is Seigfried refers to as James' radical reconstruction in philosophy (and I
add psychology): »the empirical validation of phenomenologicaly derived classi-
fications« (Seigfried, 1990, p. 12). For my present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that introvertive mysticism emerges as a distinct factor not only in explora-
tory factor analytic studies (Hood & Williamson, 2000) but also in confirmatory
factor analyses in such diverse cultures as the United States and Iran (Hood,
Ghornbani, Watson, Ghramaleki, Bing, Davison, Morris, & Williamson. (2001).
Second, as noted above, among the confessional scholars who incorporate
their own introvertive experiences into critical discussion of the unity thesis, in-
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terviews with mystics in other traditions about the nature of their introvertive
mystical experiences reveal that difference in the linguistic and cultural expression
of these experiences are mutually recognized to be essential the same experience.
Forman, who has practiced a Neo-Advaitan form of meditation twice a day since
1969 noted that his experience of PCE was acknowledged as identical to a Zen
abbot’s account of the same experience and to a Siddha Yoga’s novice’s account
of her experience (Forman, 1999, pp. 20-30).
Third, independent scholars who have sought a common phenomenology
between various traditions have been able to find it. This includes scholars whose
work had not be cross-referenced and hence reached their conclusions indepen-
dently. For instance, Brainaird (2000) found this commonality in the mystical
traditions as cultural diverse as Advaita-Vendānta Hinduism, Mādhyamika
Buddhism, and Nicene Christianity supporting previous independent conclusions
of (Loy, 1988, 1990) with respect to Advaita-Vendānta Hinduism and Mādhya-
mika Buddhism.
One should not underestimate the evidential force when diverse empirical
methods converge toward one conclusion. Methods that are rooted ultimately
in a neo-Kantian epistemology are inappropriate for the recognition of a possible
transcendent unity to diverse faith and cultural traditions that may have in
common not simply the diversity that is well documented, but a common mystical
core that whether called introvertive or pure consciousness experience is nevert-
heless the essence of what I have termed the unity thesis. Religious studies
scholars, psychoanalysts, and mystics have all argued for an epistemology that is
not rooted in Kantian or neo-Kantian philosophical assumptions (Dupré, 1980;
Barnard, 1997, Forman, 1999; Smith, 1983). The crucial empirical point is
simply that any claim to an empirical method involves philosophical assumptions
that must be acknowledge least a hidden and hence unexamined epistemology
drive an agenda that may be unfair to the object of investigation (Belzen & Hood,
2006). In studies of mysticism, the empirical fruits are largely unavailable to
those who become in the face of introvertive mystical claims a priori committed
linguistic and cultural reductionists.
The purely empirical evidence for the unity thesis has support from what
at first might seem a curious source. A major debate within the contemporary
psychology of religion centers on the conceptual and empirical distinctions bet-
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ween religion and spirituality. The literature is immense and controversial (Hood,
2003; Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005). However, independently of these litera-
tures, post-modern philosophers have begun the same debate. Cupitt (1998)
notes that human beings have been led by meditation or contemplative prayer
into »an experience of non-dual, undifferentiated unity« (1998, p. 41). Like the
major first generation of deconstructionists, Cupitt emphasizes that the mystics
were to true forerunners of deconstruction (1998, pp. 93-122). In a similar vein,
Benedikter (2000) has argued for a proto-spirituality largely rooted in an interest
in apophatic mysticism in the first generation of deconstructionists such as Lyo-
tard, Derrida, and Foucault. These figures all feared the return of a Renaissance
of religion (largely religious fundamentalism) and championed an alternative that
Benedikter (2007, part 1, p. 2) sums up in his own self-identification as »I am
spiritual but not religious.« He notes that Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard all
supported a form of knowledge that must remain an absolute secret least in be
violated by language. Benedickter (2007, Part 3, p. 8) notes, »the universe is a
paradoxical structure in itself, which concentrates its very structural predisposition
in the structural constitution of the individual, singular 'I' – of every singular 'I'
that exists.«
Benedikter concludes from a radically different literature, what Branard has
suggested would and should have been James' own conclusion had he followed
through with his own epistemological assumptions. From the results of the first
generation of deconstructionists Benedickter (2007, Part 3, p. 2) concludes:
I must be, as my own clear logic teaches me, something like a double being,
a double »I«: a normal ego that is an illusion, but also a secret witness, that beco-
mes aware of this illusion. There must be behind the normal ego an »I« which I
cannot deconstruct.« This is the same conclusion a more critical reading of James'
PP in light of his VRE also supports. In the PP we have seen that James only
needed Sciousness. Foucault spoke of »The thinking that is thinking itself« (in
Benedikter, 2007, Part 1, p. 11).
However, both in the VRE and in critiques of an absolutist deconstruction
(the counterpart to absolutist social constructionism), epistemological critiques
combined with phenomenology reach a consensus. As Branard notes,
I suggest that if James had remained faithful to his epistemology, what he
could have said, and indeed, should have said, is that we all have an immediate
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awareness of »I-ness.'« Furthermore, subtle introspection reveals that the most
accurate description of this »I« is of a contentless awareness that is continually
present beneath the constantly changing stream of consciousness that I know to
be mine (p. 160).
In the VRE there is both an introvertive mystical experience (being one
with the absolute) and also varied ranges of experiences whether they are called
mystical or not, that are clearly not introvertive experiences or PCE. Thus, as
Barnard (1997, p. 63) rightly notes, James was never committed to a single defi-
nition of mysticism and his wider definitions of mysticism tend to merge the
mystical with a variety parapsychical phenomena (Barnard, 1997 p. 200). In this
sense, as already noted, the mysticism scale proposed by Lange & Thalbourne,
(2007) is much more Jamesian that Hood’s mysticism scale in which introvertive
or PCE emerges as a clear factor, which captures only one of James' definition
of mysticism in the VRE. The Lange & Thalbourne (2007) scale also has an ad-
vantage for those who favor a wider definition of mysticism as identifying what
is clearly an empirical fact, that reports of mystical experience are associated with
reports of paranormal experiences (Hood, 1989, 2008b). However, the most Ja-
mesean measure of mysticism is transliminality that includes a variety of states,
only some of which are mystical in terms of the limited definition of mysticism
used in the Varieties.
The focus on mystical experience as a state implies that such experiences,
whether spontaneously occurring or cultivated cannot be maintained over time.
Yet the epistemological critique of James noted above, phenomenological studies,
and critiques of an absolutist deconstruction all suggest that there can also be
state mysticism.
State mysticism can be interpreted as a mystical duality where one has the
continual experience of what Roberts (1984) has called the experience of no-self.
Forman (1999, p. 140-146) also notes his own experience of no-self. While space
prohibits a complete development of this mystical state of selfless persons, there
are critical treatments of this state especially in Eastern religious and philosophical
traditions (Collins, 1982; Nishitani, 1982). Likewise, it characterizes the first
generation of deconstructionists as noted above. For example Lyotard allowed
for an Ego or a self that can be socially deconstructed, but also quasi-I that always
is absent in the presence of what remains written Ego has a proper name, can be
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situated within dated time and locales, participates in activities and the commerce
of phrases, in the human community, in all that perishes and is born again, all
that repeats itself. Ego lends its name to the written that this does not write, that
»I« quasi-writes (Lyotard, 2001, p. 44, emphasis in original).
Coward (1990) has drawn extensive parallels between Derrida’s deconstruc-
tionism and Indian philosophy. However, most significant here is Benedikter’s
(2007) recognition of the emergence of a postern modern spirituality whose
foundation has been laid, partly unwittingly, by the first generation of postmodern
deconstructionists or post-structuralist philosophers whose influence in the con-
temporary psychology of religion is not simply silent, but silenced by metaphysical
assumptions implicit in mainstream methodologies. Here I simply indicate that
while we have no empirical measure yet of state mysticism, we do have empirical
reports that individuals can experience an »I« located in awareness itself, detached
from any contents of consciousness (Deikman, 1982). Here a limited social con-
structionism and a limited deconstruction meet. The contents of consciousness
necessarily reveal cultural and linguistic shaping and hence can also be deconstruc-
ted. They are most associated with religion, not spirituality. The experience of
the no-self, or »I« and its relationship to introvertive mysticism is both a concep-
tual and empirical issue worthy of further investigation. I suggest that this expe-
rience is likely to follow introvertive mystical experiences conceived as trait my-
sticisms. This empirical proposition can be tested and is consistent with both
Almond (1982) and Hood (19989) who argue that extrovertive mysticism is li-
kely to follow introvertive mystical experiences and not proceed them as suggested
by Stace. However, while both introvertive and extrovertive are trait mysticisms,
the experience of the »I« as a conscious witness is a state mysticism.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize that scholars working in a single vineyard
cannot gather the ranges of fruits already ripened. Nor can they be collected using
one empirical methodology. However, the fruits waiting to be gathered are worth
acknowledging. I will end by summarizing them for both state and trait mysti-
cisms.
For state mysticism one cannot simply declare a contentless awareness or
PCE to be impossible on Kantian or neo-Kantian grounds. Persons do experience
introvertive mystical states; they can be facilitated under experimental and quasi-
experimental conditions; their report can be reliably measured; widely differing
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faith traditions in differing cultural contexts provide contemplative paths to faci-
litate this state; and finally, these states also occur and are common outside faith
traditions, especially among those who identify themselves as spiritual but not
religions (Hood, 2003; Spilka et al.,003, Ch. 10)). Such states are acknowledged
by psychoanalysts, religious studies scholars, empirical psychologists, and confes-
sional scholars as I have noted above. Finally, as emphasized by Almond (1982
p. 176) »In so far as we are speaking of contentless mystical experiences, there is
unanimity and a universality which transcends the cultural content in which they
occur.«
For trait mysticism the conclusions are a bit more tentative. We need mea-
sures of the report of trait mysticism. But insofar as we have phenomenological
reports of this experience from a variety of traditions and from individuals who
concur in their experience of no-self, we have evidence that if psychology refuses
to empirically investigate the conditions that facilitate this experience, it cannot
rest complacent with the hidden philosophical assumption that such experiences
cannot exist. The study of such experiences would allow social constructionists,
deconstructionists, and cultural psychologists to test the limits of their perspectives
against claims to experience that would seem to allow constructionist (and thus
deconstructionist) explanations for what is witnessed in consciousness but not
for that which witnesses. In this sense, both state and trait mysticism might be
linked in ways that would be empirically worth noting and conceptually profound.
Are these not the true fruits to be harvested from the conceptual clarification of
what is already empirically known about mysticism?
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